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I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the Minnesota Human Rights Act has been in effect
for over forty-five years, the provision stating that it is the exclusive
procedure for certain claims has only recently been applied. The
provision has been held to preempt certain claims but not to bar
others. This article provides a brief historical perspective of the exclusivity provision, discusses how courts have applied the provision
in connection with various employment-related claims, and analyzes the provision and its application.
t
The author is a Shareholder in Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., and Chair of its
Employment & Labor Practice Group. He received his B.A. from Syracuse University in 1968 and his J.D. in 1976 from St. John's University School of Law (N.Y.).
He has been an Adjunct Professor of Law at William Mitchell College of Law since
1993, teaching Employment Discrimination. He is also an Adjunct Professor at
the University of St. Thomas, and was elected to the College of Labor and Employment Lawyers in 1998.
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THE HISTORY OF THE PROVISION

The Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA") was enacted on
April 20, 1955. In its original form, the statute included the exclusivity provision now set forth at Minnesota Statute section 363.11.
Presumably because the language was clear and unambiguous,
there was no legislative discussion regarding the terms. Thus, it is a
provision without a "legislative history."
The exclusivity provision in Minnesota Statute section 363.11
states "as to acts declared unfair by section 363.03, the procedure
herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive." Although the
MHRA has been amended several times since its enactment, the
exclusivity provision has remained constant.
Almost thirty-five years passed before any court discussed the
exclusivity provision. Ironically, the first decision citing to the provision was Karst v. F C. Hayer Co., Inc.' In Karst, the Minnesota Supreme Court held the exclusivity provision of the Minnesota workers' compensation statute preempted the MHRA.' The court held
that the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation statute
prevailed over the MHRA with respect to an individual claiming
disability discrimination based on the same facts as a workers' compensation claim. The court reasoned:
In a situation such as this, imposing liability under the
Human Rights Act in addition to the remedies provided
in the Workers' Compensation Act will add a tremendous
financial burden on employers. Defending these suits is
burdensome enough. Together with potential damage
awards, this dual liability will fundamentally change the
workers' compensation system. Such a dramatic change
in employer liability should be made, if necessary, by the
legislature following hearings and legislative debate.

1. 447 N.W.2d 180, 186 (Minn. 1989).
2. Id. The court noted that normally the statute most recently enacted prevails. Id. Here, the MHRA was enacted in 1955 and the exclusivity provision in the
workers' compensation law was enacted in 1953. Id. Nevertheless, the court did
not apply this rule of construction as both statutes were amended in 1983. Id. at
186-87.
3. Id. It is noteworthy that the legislature amended both statutes several
times since the Karst decision yet it has not amended either exclusivity provision.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss2/56

2

2000]

Ross: How Exclusive Is the Exclusivity Provision of the Minnesota Human
EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION

1065

III. APPLICATION OF THE PROVISION
A.

Battery4

A month after the Karst decision, the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued its decision in Wiig v. Kinney Shoe Corp.,5 the first reported decision interpreting the exclusivity provision of the MHRA.
In this case, the plaintiff alleged that she had been kissed and
touched in a sexually offensive manner by one of her supervisors.
In holding that the exclusivity provision of the MHRA preempted
her common law battery claim, the court of appeals had explained:
From the definition of battery and the statutory definition
of sexual harassment, it is clear that the Minnesota Human Rights Act makes it an unfair employer practice to
subject an employee to battery of sexual nature in connection with employment. Under the preemption section of
the Act, a sexually motivated battery at work is an "act declared unfair by section 363.03." ...Wirig's battery claim
arose out of the same acts which give rise to the sexual
harassment claim. The record is devoid of any unpermitted, offensive bodily contact other than the contact of a
sexual nature at work. Although the bodily contact here
amounted to a battery, it is also sexual harassment, an unfair act under the statute. There were many acts of sexual
harassment shown not constituting battery; the gravamen
of the complaint sounds in sexual harassment.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' decision in
Wirig.7 The supreme court noted there is a presumption that statutory law is consistent with common law. Thus, if a statute was
meant to abrogate common law, there must be an express provision to that effect in the statute. 8 The court reviewed the exclusivity
provision of the MHRA and found that nothing in the statute expressly abrogated common law battery. 9
4. A battery is defined as an intentional, unpermitted offensive bodily contact with another. Paradise v. City of Minneapolis, 297 N.W.2d 152, 153 (Minn.
1980). An employer may be liable for a battery by its employee if (1) the employer
approves of or should have reasonably foreseen the battery, and (2) the battery
occurred at a time and place related to the employment. Marston v. Minneapolis
Clinic of Psychiatry, 329 N.W.2d 306, 310-11 (Minn. 1982).
5. 448 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
6. Id. at 530.
7. Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 374 (Minn. 1990).
8. Id. at 377-78.
9. Id. at 378.
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The court then discussed the purpose of the MHRA and the
provision that it be liberally construed. The court noted that the
"essence of the MHRA is societal change " ' ° and stated:
Elimination of employment discrimination and establishment of equal employment opportunities and conditions
for both sexes is not effectuated by declaring common law
battery preempted by an MHRA sexual harassment action.
Battery does not address discriminatory tendencies. It did
not develop to change society's biases or prejudices. Although under certain circumstances sexually motivated
battery might fit the definition of sexual harassment, the
purpose of the MHRA does not suggest that sexually motivated battery should be impliedly abrogated as an act declared unfair by the statute. The legislature did not design the MHRA to redress intentional offensive physical
contact already addressed by a tort battery action. Therefore, we hold that a sexual harassment action brought
pursuant to the MHRA does not bar a parallel action for
common law battery.I
B. Negligent Infliction Of EmotionalDistress12
Initially, it appeared that the supreme court's decision in Wirig
created a "bright line" test: a pre-existing common law claim would
not be preempted by the exclusivity provision of the MHRA. However, less than a week after deciding Wiig, the supreme court denied review of the court of appeals' decision to apply the exclusivity
provision in Melsha v. Wickes Cos, Inc. 3
In Melsha, the plaintiff asserted both a common law claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and a sexual harassment
claim. The court of appeals, relying on its earlier decision in Wiig,
10. Id.
11. Id. at 378-79. The court did hold, however, that Wirig could not recover
double damages for the same harm. Id. at 379.
12. In order to establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
a plaintiff must show the "plaintiff is within a zone of danger of physical impact,
reasonably fears for his or her own safety, and consequently suffers severe emotional distress with resultant physical injury." Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg. Co., 411
N.W.2d 902, 907-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), Nov. 13, 1987 (citing Stadler v. Cross,
295 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn. 1980)). See also Leaon v. Washington County, 397
N.W.2d 867, 875 (Minn. 1986). In addition, in lieu of being physically within the
"zone of danger," a plaintiff may also recover for emotional distress for "a direct
invasion of his rights, such as defamation, malicious prosecution, or other willful
or malicious conduct." Bohdan, 411 N.W.2d at 907 (citations omitted).
13. 459 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), rev. denied, Oct. 25, 1990.
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held the exclusivity provision of the MHRA preempted plaintiff's
negligence claim since there were no separate facts to support her
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.14 The court of appeals, acknowledging that Wiig was under review by the supreme
court, stated:
Both parties agree that if Wirig is affirmed, respondent's
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim would be
barred. The trial court acknowledged the holding in
Wirig, and its acceptance of the claim was premised on
uncertainty how the decision would be affected by Supreme Court review. At present, we have no cause to disregard this part of the holding in Wiig we rather confirm
it. Because no damages were awarded on the negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim, we reverse solely to
exclude
the judgment that this was a valid cause of ac15
tion.
Ironically, the court of appeals did not address how its decision
would be affected if the supreme court reversed Wiig. It is also
noteworthy that the court of appeals chose to reverse judgment in
connection with a cause of action that did not affect the ultimate
determination. Curiously, the supreme court declined review of
the case.
As can be seen in the following discussions as to other claims,
and in the conclusion of this article, the supreme court has yet to
define the entire scope of the MHRA's exclusivity provision.
C. Negligence

6

The tort of negligence in employment actions has only been
discussed in one case. The plaintiff in the unpublished case of Wise
v. DigitalEquip. Corp., 7 apparently asserted a negligence claim, in
addition to negligent training and supervision claims. The court of
appeals held that her negligence claims were preempted by the exclusivity provision of the MHRA. The court distinguished Wiig and
held:
Wise's negligence claims.. .are distinguishable from a bat14.

Id.

15.

Id. at 709-710.

16. The common law claim of negligence is based on the theory that a defendant owes a duty of care to a plaintiff, and in breaching that duty causes an injury,
the proximate cause of which is the breach. Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326
N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn. 1982).
17. No. C9-94-461, 1994 WL 664973, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 1994).
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tery claim in that the very duty that Wise claims that Digital breached is created by the MHRA. Prior to the enactment of the MHRA, the common law imposed no duty on
employers to take prompt remedial action in response to
an employee's complaint about allegedly inappropriate
behavior nor to exercise due care in training and supervising employees to prevent harassment. Thus Wise's negligence claims are not parallel with her sexual harassment
claim, but rather are identical, and we agree with the trial
court that they are preempted by the MHRA. is
In addition to the Wise case, there are at least two cases involving general negligence claims in which courts have considered
whether to apply the exclusivity provision of the MHRA.
In Vaughn v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,' 9 the supreme court held
the exclusivity provision of the MHRA did not preempt a negligence claim. In Vaughn, the plaintiff claimed that she was injured
when she was carrying and stowing her luggage on board a Northwest Airlines flight. She claimed that she repeatedly informed
Northwest agents that she was disabled and under a doctor's orders
to avoid straining herself. She asserted that despite her repeated
requests, she received no assistance and was injured.
Vaughn sued
20
MHRA.
the
of
violation
a
as
well
as
for negligence
The supreme court relied on its earlier decision in Wirig and
held that Vaughn's negligence claim was not preempted. In so ruling, the court again "rejected the notion that factually parallel
causes of action are not mutually exclusive. ,,21 Significandy, the
court acknowledged but did not overrule or even clarify the court
of appeals' holding in Melsha.22
18. Id. at *2. The plaintiff in Wise alleged that her supervisor made bodily
contact with her by bumping or touching her. She claimed that the contact made
her uncomfortable. Id. at *1. Significantly, the "battery" in the Wifigcase involved
her supervisor kissing, pinching, patting her and putting his arm around her.
Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Minn. 1990). Perhaps if the
plaintiff in Wise had claimed battery instead of negligence, the court would have
reached a different result. Although it appears that Wiig's battery was clearly
more sexual than the contact alleged in Wise, the court held the battery was a
breach of the duty created by the MHRA. Wise, 1994 WL 664973, at *2.
19. 558 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1997).
20. Id. at 736. Vaughn claimed a violation of the public accommodation provision of the MHRA. MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (3) (a) (1994).
21. Vaughn, 558 N.W.2d at 745.
22. Id. The court stated: "Northwest argues that Vaughn did not allege 'separate facts to support a negligence claim,' and cites Melsha v. Wickes Cos., Inc. Melsha was decided before our decision in Wirig, and Northwest's reliance on it is misplaced." Id. (citation omitted).
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In B.F. v. Smith,13 a subsequent unpublished decision, the court
of appeals held the plaintiffs common law negligence claim was
preempted by the MHRA. In Smith, the plaintiff asserted she had
been sexually harassed in school by one of her teachers. 24 Relying
on an earlier decision, 5 and completely ignoring the supreme
court's holdings in Wirig and Vaughn, the court of appeals held
"that a litigant may not bring a common-law negligence claim alleging discriminatory practices,
injuries, and damages identical with
26
[her] MHRA claim."

It is unclear why the supreme court and the court of appeals
appear to come to completely opposite conclusions based on the
same question, namely: Can identical factual allegations giving rise
to a common law claim that would also be discriminatory conduct
under the MHRA survive the exclusivity provision in the MHRA?
This Alice in Wonderland question remains to be answered.
1.

Negligent Hiring"

At the time of writing this article, there were no published or
unpublished decisions in which the MHRA exclusivity provision was
applied to a claim of negligent hiring. Presumably, the courts will
apply the same reasoning as they have in the negligent retention
and negligent supervision cases discussed in the next sections.

23. No. C8-97-1468, 1998 WL 101348, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. March 10, 1998).
24. Smith, 1998 WL 101348, at *1. The plaintiff claimed that her teacher massaged her shoulders, then touched her stomach and moved his hands up to her
breasts and fondled her breasts. Id. She also claimed that he inserted his fingers
into the top of her pants, touched her genital area and attempted to expose himself to her. Id.
25. Sullivan v. Spot Weld, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
26. Smith, 1998 WL 101348, at *5 (citing Sullivan, 560 N.W.2d at 717).
27. The tort of negligent hiring was recognized in 1983. Ponticus v. K.M.S.
Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983). Liability under negligent hiring is
"predicated on the negligence of the employer in placing a person with known
propensities, or propensities which should have been discovered by reasonable
investigation, in an employment position in which, because of the circumstances
of the employment, it should have been foreseeable that the hired individual
posed a threat of injury to others." Id.
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28

Negligent Retention

In Huffman v. Pepsi-ColaBottling Co. of Minneapolis and St. Paul,'9
(an unpublished decision), the plaintiff asserted claims of sexual
harassment, along with claims of negligent retention and negligent
supervision. In addition to harassment that was clearly sexual in
nature (e.g. sexual comments, inappropriate touching, sexually explicit magazines, cartoons and computer games at work):
[The plaintiff was] threatened with a knife by a coworker
who had a history of threatening and physically assaulting
coworkers. Pepsi had a duty of care to Huffman. Pepsi
breached that duty by failing to take any disciplinary action against this employee. The record also contains evidence that Huffman was subjected to verbal and physical
threats that were not sexual in nature or related to her
sex, such as being thrown into a bay truck, having her
timecard altered, and having her forklift moved.
The court noted that there were separate incidents of sexual
harassment and non-sexual conduct. In holding that the exclusivity
provision would not be applied in this case, the court stated:
Sexual harassment requires that the conduct be sexually
motivated. Negligent retention/supervision, on the other
hand, applies to intentional conduct by an employee,
generally outside the scope of employment. Threats of
physical violence by a coworker or physical contact unrelated to sex would not fall under the Minnesota Human
Rights Act. The facts support Huffman's negligence
claims. There are also facts sufficient to support a claim
completely separate from her Minnesota Human Rights
Act claim.
28. Minnesota has long recognized that an employer has a duty to refrain
from retaining employees with known dangerous proclivities. Porter v. Grennan
Bakeries, Inc., 219 Minn. 14, 21-22, 16 N.W.2d 906, 910 (1944); Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Fawkes, 120 Minn. 353, 357-58, 139 N.W. 703, 705 (1913); Yunker v. Honeywell, Inc., 496 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Negligent retention is distinct from negligent hiring. Yunker, 496 N.W.2d at 423. A claim of negligent hiring arises "when the employer was on notice that an employee posed a threat and
failed to take steps to insure the safety of third parties." Id. Negligent retention
occurs when, after the employee has been hired, the employer becomes aware or should
have become aware of facts that show the employee posed a threat and the employer failed to investigate or take some action such as terminating the employee
or reassigning the employee. Id.
29. No. C7-94-2404, 1995 WL 434467, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 25, 1995).
30. Id. at *4.
31. Id. at *5.
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In Mandy v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., 32 judge
Tunheim, discussed the application of the MHRA exclusivity provision in the context of a negligent retention claim and a sexual harassment claim.3 3 After determining the plaintiff had asserted a
claim of negligent retention, Judge Tunheim proceeded to address
the issue of preemption by the MHRA and reversed Magistrate
Judge Mason's decision that the negligent retention claim was preempted. Judge Tunheim stated:
The Magistrate Judge concluded that the claims were preempted based solely on the holdings in an unpublished
Minnesota Court of Appeals case, Wise v. DigitalEquipment
Corp. The Wise court held that prior to the MHRA there
was no duty imposed on an employer to take prompt remedial action to respond to sexual harassment. The court
held that because the duty alleged in Wise was created by
the MHRA, the plaintiffs negligence claim was preempted by the exclusivity provision of the MHRA found in
Minnesota Statute section 363.11... The Minnesota Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of preemption
of negligent retention or supervision claims by the MHRA
or the [Workers' Compensation Act]. The Wise case is
unpublished and contains little analysis of these important
state law issues... Under these circumstances, it is unclear

how the Minnesota Supreme Court would resolve the
MHRA preemption issue in this case. 34
Because the defendant in Mandy failed to sustain the burden
required for judgment as a matter of law, Judge Tunheim reversed
Magistrate Mason's decision and denied the defendant's motion
for summary judgment on the negligent retention claim. The
judge did state, however, that he might entertain a motion for partial summary judgment on the preemption issue when the record
was more fully developed3 5
32. 940 F. Supp. 1463 (D. Minn. 1996).
33. Mandy, 940 F. Supp. at 1466. Mandy claimed that her supervisor made
repeated comments about her body, sexual advances toward her (including grabbing her sweatshirt and looking down her shirt and commenting on her breasts)
and gave her unwelcome attention, including telephone calls, cards and gifts. Id.
34. Id. at 1471-72 (footnote and citations omitted).
35. Id. at 1472-73. Approximately a year after his decision in Mandy, Judge
Tunheim reached a similar decision in Thompson v. Olsten Kimberly Qualitycare,Inc.,
980 F. Supp. 1035, 1041 (D. Minn. 1997). In Thompson, Judge Tunheim again discussed the Minnesota Supreme Court's holdings in Vaughn and Wirig, but noted
that the confusion apparently was amplified by the Minnesota Court of Appeals'
ruling in Sullivan v. Spot Weld, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) and its
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Judge Doty, in Moss v. Advance Circuits, Inc., came to a different conclusion than Judge Tunheim did in Mandy. In Moss, Judge
Doty first discussed the Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions in
Vaughn and Wirig and then held that the plaintiff's negligent retention claim was preempted by the MHRA. Judge Doty stated:
In this case, there is no doubt plaintiff's negligence claims
arise from the same duty as her harassment claim under
the MHRA. Plaintiff's negligence claims are based entirely on Advance Circuit's actions after being made aware
of Maxon's alleged discriminatory conduct.
Unlike
Vaughn and Wirig, therefore, there is no distinction in duties owed between the MHRA and common law claims.
Since plaintiff has not identified any duty owed her separate from the duty created by the MHRA, the negligen [t]
[retention] claims are preempted and summary judgment
on these claims is granted.
In Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 9 Magistrate Judge
Erickson, followingJudge Doty's decision in Moss, ruled the MHRA
will preempt a negligent retention claim were an employee's claim
(in a sexual harassment action) is based entirely on the employer's
actions after being made aware of the harassment. 0 Similarly, in
Breitenfeldt v. Long PrairiePacking Co., Inc.,41 Judge Frank held that
reliance on the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey
Med. Ctr., 551 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. 1996). Judge Tunheim then stated that he
agreed with his earlier holding in Mandy, and because of the continued unsettled
state of the law on the preemption issue, he declined to dismiss the negligent retention claim on preemption grounds. Thompson, 980 F. Supp at 1039-40.
36. 981 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Minn. 1997).
37. Id. at 1252. The plaintiff asserted both race and sex discrimination violations of the MHRA. She claimed that her supervisor stared at her breasts when
talking with her and made a comment about his dancing at a company event, telling her "hey, not bad for a white guy." Id. at 1243. She also claimed that another
supervisor, when passing her in the hall, said "yo, mama." Id. She also asserted
that another supervisor rubbed her shoulders and back on one occasion. Id. at
1242-43.
38. Id. at 1252 (footnote omitted).
39. 25 F. Supp. 2d 953 (D. Minn. 1998).
40. Grozdanich, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 981. Grozdanich, a nurse, claimed that her
supervisor engaged in three separate acts of sexual assault on her in one day. In
the first incident, he grabbed her buttocks while she was performing a delicate
procedure on a patient. In the second incident, her supervisor sat next to her,
placed his hand on her right inner thigh and slid his hand up and touched her
vagina. The third incident involved the supervisor pinning her against a bed rail
from behind and grabbing her hips and pressing his pelvic area against her buttocks, so that she could feel his erect penis. Id. at 962.
41. 48 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Minn. 1999). Here, Breitenfeldt claimed that his
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because the plaintiff failed to allege any separate factual predicate
for his negligent retention claim, the MHRA preempted that
claim.42
3.

Negligent Supervision43

The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
negligent supervision claims are preempted by the MHRA. However, the court of appeals, in two reported cases, held negligent supervision claims are preempted by the MHRA. In Sullivan v. Spot
Weld, Inc.,44 the court held that "Sullivan's negligent supervision
claim alleges discriminatory practices, injuries, and damages identical with those in his MHRA claim. Furthermore, Sullivan cites no
authority for the proposition that his common law negligent supervision claim against his employer has a basis independent of the
MHRA."45
In Hoover v. Nonest PrivateMortgage Banking, A Div. of Norwest

Funding,Inc., 6 a very recent case, the court of appeals affirmed the
dismissal of plaintiffs disability discrimination and reprisal claims.
Relying on its earlier decision in Sullivan and the Minnesota Sumale co-workers would hold him down, sometimes in a bin of raw meat or a
trough of blood, and simulate oral and anal sex acts. The co-workers also grabbed
or hit his testicles, forcing or rubbing a steel rod between his legs, and subjected
him to verbal acts of sexual harassment including calling him "Fargo Fag," and referring to oral and anal homosexual acts. Id. at 1170.
42. Id. at 1180.
43. Unlike negligent hiring or negligent retention, the claim of negligent supervision is based on a theory of respondeat superior,since the basis of the liability is
that the wrongful conduct is actually committed in the scope of the individual's
employment. Bruchas v. Preventive Care, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996). An employer that conducts an activity through its employees is subject
to liability for harm resulting from the conduct, if (i) the employer is negligent in
the supervision of the employee, Id. at 443, and (ii) the employee's conduct was
foreseeable. Olsin v. State of Minn., 543 N.W.2d 408, 415 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
Thus, the employee must actually be engaged in some conduct on behalf of the
employer, using the employer's "chattels," or on the employer's premises when
the injury occurs. Yunker v. Honeywell, Inc., 496 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993).
44. 560 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
45. Id. at 716. Sullivan claimed that he was subjected to racial epithets by coworkers and supervisors that created a hostile work environment. He asserted that
his employer failed to take any corrective action. Id. at 712.
46. 605 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000), rev. granted on other issues, Apr. 25,

2000. Hoover claimed she was subjected to disability discrimination (based on her
diagnosis of fibromyalgia, with symptoms of severe headaches, back pain, neck
pain, shoulder pain, exhaustion, and sleep disturbances) and reprisal in violation
of the MHRA. Id. at 760.
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preme Court's decision in Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center,
Inc., 47 the court of appeals stated:
Hoover cites as an independent common law duty the
employer's duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace by
providing her with processor support to accommodate her
disability. The duty Hoover describes is not a duty to prevent known hazards or dangers, but a duty to accommodate a disability. This duty did not exist at common law,
but was created by the MHRA. The exclusivity provisions
of the MHRA therefore preempt Hoover's negligent su48
pervision claim.
In addition to the Sullivan and Hoover decisions, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals applied the same holdings from the negligent retention claims to the negligent supervision claims. Thus, in Wise,
the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment dismissing the
plaintiffs negligent supervision claim, as well as her negligent retention claim, because the claims were identical to her sexual harassment claim.49 In contrast, but coming to the same conclusion
with respect to the negligent retention claim, the court of appeals
in Huffman, held the plaintiff alleged sufficient separate facts from
her sexual harassment claim to assert an independent claim for
negligent supervision. 50
Similarly, judges for the Federal District of Minnesota who
ruled on the preemption issue, reached the same conclusions regarding the negligent supervision claims as they did regarding the
negligent retention claims.'
47. 551 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. 1996); see also discussion infra Part IV.D.
48. Hoover, 605 N.W.2d at 768 (citations omitted).
49. Wise v. Digital Equip. Corp., No. C9-94-461, 1994 WL 664973, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 1994).
50. Huffman v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., No. C7-94-2404, 1995 WL 434467, at
*5 (Minn. Ct. App. July 25, 1995), rev. dismissed, Sept. 20, 1995.
51. Breitenfeldt v. Long Prairie Packing Co., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1181
(D. Minn. 1999) (holding the negligent supervision and negligent retention
claims were preempted by the MHRA); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr.,
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 991-92 (D. Minn. 1998) (holding the negligent supervision and negligent retention claims would be preempted when based entirely on a
sexual harassment claim); Moss v. Advance Circuits, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1239, 1254
(D. Minn. 1997) (granting summary judgment dismissing the negligent supervision and negligent retention claims as being preempted by the MHRA); Thompson v. Olsten Kimberly Qualitycare, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1035, 1041 (D. Minn. 1997)
(declining to dismiss the negligent supervision and negligent retention claims due
to the "unsettled" state of the law); Mandy v. Minn. Mining and Mfg., 940 F. Supp.
1463, 1474 (D. Minn. 1996) (denying summary judgment preempting the negligent supervision and retention claims).
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Negligent Training

Minnesota does not recognize the tort of negligent training. 2
Thus, there has been no occasion for the courts to determine
whether such a claim would be preempted by the MHRA. Presumably, if such a claim existed, the courts would apply the same
standard they apply in claims of negligent retention and negligent
supervision.
D. Minnesota Whistleblower Act"
In Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., Inc.,54 the Minnesota

Supreme Court held the plaintiffs reprisal claim under the MHRA
preempted her whistleblower claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act ("MWA"). In Williams, the plaintiff asserted her employment was terminated because she filed a charge of sexual harassment with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights. 55 She
also asserted a claim under the MWA based on the identical facts.
In its decision, the supreme court offered insight into its position
on the exclusivity provision when it distinguished Wirig. Rather
than address the issue in terms of the philosophical application and
intent of the MHRA as it did in Wirig, the court appeared to take a
more pedestrian view of the issue stating:
While in Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., the plaintiff was authorized to maintain a sexual harassment action under
the [Minnesota] Human Rights Act and a parallel action
for common law battery arising from the same facts, we so
held because these separate causes of action require different ele52. M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849, 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied, July 20, 1995; Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, No. C7-95-2, 1995 WL
3791401, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App.June 27, 1995). Interestingly, a claim of negligent
training was apparently asserted in Wise, but the court did not address the issue of
whether such a claim is recognized in Minnesota, but applied the same logic in
dismissing the negligent supervision claim when it dismissed the negligent training claim as being preempted by the MHRA. Wise, 1994 WL 664973, at *1.
53. The Minnesota Whistleblower Act prohibits an employer from, inter alia,
discharging or discriminating against an employee who reports a violation of a
state or federal law to the employer or to a governmental agency. MINN. STAT. §
181.932 (1994).
54. 551 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. 1996).
55. Id. at 483. Williams, a pharmacy technician, claimed that one of the pharmacists repeatedly asked her for dates and when she refused, he began to make
sexual comments to her and became hostile. She complained to her supervisor
and an investigation ensued. The investigation found her claims to be without
merit. Id. at 484.
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ments of proof and address different injuries. We conclude
that [the same] analysis is not appropriate here and that
the exclusivity provision of the [Minnesota] Human
Rights Act operates as a bar to the separate maintenance
6
of this claim under the [Minnesota] Whistleblower Act.1
Thus, the supreme court's holding in Williams appears to
adopt the standard articulated by the court of appeals in Melsha.
E. Breach Of Contract
In the unpublished decision of the court of appeals in Humenansky v. Board of Regents,57 the plaintiff asserted an age discrimination claim and retaliation claim under the MHRA. He also alleged a breach of contract claim. 8 In a novel attempt to avoid the
holdings in Williams and Sullivan, plaintiff asserted that his breach
of contract claim did not rely on his MHRA claims. However, the
court of appeals held that the exclusivity provision preempted the
contract claim based on two rationales:
[T]he only acts described in Humenansky's complaint
as the basis for either of his MHRA claims or the breach of
contract claim are age discrimination and retaliation,
both declared unfair by the MHRA ....
[But], [u]nlike the
claims of the plaintiffs in Wirig and Vaughn, Humenansky's
MHRA claims and breach of contract claim
require the same
59
elements of proof and address the same injury.
While a breach of contract claim could certainly address the
same "injury" as a statutory violation of the MHRA (i.e., termination of employment), it is difficult to understand how the court of
appeals concluded that a breach of contract claim could involve the
same elements of proof as a statutory claim. The courts in Minnesota have routinely applied the "shifting burden of proof' criteria
to establish a violation of the MHRA, 60 while a breach of contract

56. Id. at 485 (emphasis added, citation omitted).
57. No. CX-98-218, 1998 WL 436879, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1998), rev.
denied, Sept. 30, 1998.
58. Humenansky, 1998 WL 436879, at *1. "The breach of contract claim asserts no facts or injuries other than those asserted as the basis for the MHRA
claims." Id.
59. Id. at *3 (emphasis added, citations omitted). Significantly, this is nearly
the identical language used by the supreme court in Williams.
60. Feges v. Perkins Rests., Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 710-11 (Minn. 1992);
Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. 1986); Danz v. Jones, 263
N.W.2d 395, 399 (Minn. 1978).
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claim requires proof of completely different elements. 6' The better
rationale is that the only facts in the complaint were the facts supporting the MHRA claim.
F

Wrongful Discharge

Although Minnesota does not recognize a common law claim
for wrongful discharge, at least one court held such a claim would
be preempted by the MHRA. In Thompson v. Campbell,62 Judge Doty
acknowledged that Minnesota does not recognize a common law
cause of action that "exists independently" of the Minnesota Whisdeblower Act. 63 Interestingly, relying on the Wiig decision, he
noted, however, "to the extent Thompson seeks redress for conduct redressed by the MHRA, her common law claim is precluded
by that statute. Minnesota law precludes common law claims for
adverse employment actions covered by the MHRA."'' 6
Judge Doty's "virtual" application of the exclusivity provision of
the MHRA to the plaintiff's non-existent wrongful discharge claim
foreshadowed the later application of the provision to claims under
the Minnesota Whistleblower Act and negligent retention, both of
65
which were asserted by Thompson.
G. ArbitrationAgreements

The most recent discussion of the application of the MHRA's
exclusivity provision by the Minnesota Supreme Court came in the
context of an arbitration clause. In Correll v. DistinctiveDentalServs.,
P.A., 66 the supreme court held an agreement to arbitrate disputes
between an employee and an employer was preempted by the exclusivity provision of the MHRA.
61. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628-30 (Minn. 1983).
62. 845 F. Supp. 665 (D. Minn. 1994).
Thompson claimed she was
terminated because she complained she had been sexually harassed by her
supervisor. Her allegations included that he commented on the breasts and
buttocks of female employees and on one occasion, attempted to place his arm
around her shoulders. She and other employees complained to management
about his behavior. The supervisor was placed on probation as a result.
Thompson was later terminated for violating the company's conflict of interest
policy in connection with selling outside insurance. Id. at 670-71.
63. Id. at 675.
64. Id. at 676 n.lI (citations omitted).
65. Moss v. Advance Circuits, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1239, 1254 (D. Minn. 1997);
Sullivan v. Spot Weld, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
66. 607 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Minn. 2000).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000

15

1078

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 56
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:2

In Correll, the plaintiff filed a charge with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights against his employer, alleging marital
status discrimination. Based on an employment agreement signed
by the plaintiff, which included an arbitration provision, the employer filed a demand for arbitration.6 7 In response, the plaintiff
petitioned the district court to stay the arbitration based on the exclusivity provision of the MHRA. The employer filed a cross motion to compel arbitration relying on the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act. T
The district court granted the plaintiffs petition to stay the
arbitration and denied the employer's cross-motion to compel arbitration. The court of appeals reversed. 69 The supreme court reversed the court of appeals. The supreme court noted that,
"[a]lthough section 363.11 of the Human Rights Act and section
572.08 of the Arbitration Act are unambiguous when considered
separately, the relationship between the two sections is less clear
and will
determine whether Correll's claim is subject to arbitra70
tion.,
Initially, the supreme court discussed the circumstances in
which the exclusivity provision would not apply, or stated differently, the situations in which arbitration of MHRA claims would be
permitted. The supreme court noted that the MHRA permits arbitration of claims in two situations." The first is if arbitration begins
before filing a charge or bringing a lawsuit under the statute. 72- In
that instance, the one-year limitation period for filing a charge or
bringing a lawsuit does not run while the claim is being arbitrated.
The employer must inform the Minnesota Department of Human
Rights, however, of (i) the fact the claim is being arbitrated, (ii) the
date the arbitration commences, and (iii) the date the arbitration
ends.
The second situation in which arbitration of MHRA claims is
permitted is if the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of
67. Id. at 442. Correll's employment agreement included a provision that he
would not compete with the clinic within a seven-mile radius. When the employer
discovered that Correll's wife, who was also a dentist, was working for another
clinic within the geographic limitation, it terminated Correll's employment. Id.
68. MINN. STAT. § 572.08 (2000).
69. Correll v. Distinctive Dental Svcs., P.A., 594 N.W.2d 222 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999), rev'd, 607 N.W.2d 440 (Minn. 2000).
70. Correll,607 N.W.2d at 445.
71.
Id. at 444.
72. Id.
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Human Rights sanctions the arbitration before the issuance of a
probable cause determination. 73 Here again, the one-year limitation period is suspended while the arbitration is proceeding.
The supreme court in Correll held that a provision in an employment agreement, in which an employer and employee agree to
arbitrate a MHRA claim, may not be enforceable and may be pre74
empted by the exclusivity provision of the statute.
IV. CONCLUSION

A simple quantitative analysis of the holdings of Minnesota
courts reveals that most courts considering the exclusivity provision
have held it preempts various common law and statutory claims.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held the MHRA preempts the
application of an arbitration provision and the Minnesota Uniform
Arbitration Act (Correll), and the Minnesota Whistleblower Act
(Williams). Similarly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has applied
the exclusivity provision of the MHRA to preempt claims of negligent supervision (Hoover, Sullivan, and Wise), negligent retention
(Wise), negligent infliction of emotional distress (Melsha) and
breach of contract (Humenansky).
In addition, the federal district court has generally applied the
exclusivity provision and preempted the common law claims of
negligent supervision and negligent retention (Moss, Grozdanich,
and Breitenfeldt), and wrongful discharge (Thompson) .75
In contrast, the Minnesota Supreme Court held the exclusivity
provision did not preempt a common law battery claim (Wirig) and
a general negligence claim (Vaughn). Only once did the Minnesota

73.

Id.

74. Id. at 447. However, the court did provide one potential avenue by which
employers may be able to require arbitration of MHRA claims pursuant to an employment agreement. The court noted that the employer in Correll had not
claimed its employment agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA). Id. at 442. The inference is that the FAA may apply if an employer provides evidence that its agreement involves interstate commerce (a threshold requirement for application of the FAA). The court had held in another case that, if
the FAA applies to an employment agreement containing an arbitration provision,
it preempts the MHRA and an employee's MHRA claims will be subject to arbitration pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530
N.W.2d 790, 803-04 (Minn. 1995).
75. Although Judge Tunheim declined to dismiss claims of negligent supervision and negligent retention in Mandy, he did so on the grounds that there were
sufficient facts in dispute to deny summary judgment. Mandy v. Minn. Mining &
Mfg., 940 F. Supp. 1463, 1473 (D. Minn. 1996).
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Court of Appeals decline to preempt negligent supervision and
negligent retention claims on the grounds that the alleged conduct
was clearly not prohibited by the MHRA (Huffman).
As noted earlier, these contradictory holdings tend to leave the
issue in an Alice in Wonderland status. Although the supreme court
in Wirig held the common law claim of battery "does not address
discrimination,''16 it is clear that the offensive physical contact in
that case was entirely sexual in nature. In its zeal to liberally interpret the MHRA, it is respectfully submitted that Wirig was wrongly
decided. The better interpretation is that the legislature expressly
intended the statute to preempt any common law or statutory law
claims based upon the same underlying facts.
In an apparent attempt to revise its prior holding, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Williams "clarified" its holding in Wirig by
stating that it permitted the battery claim to proceed because it required "different elements of proof and address [ed] different injuries. 77 Significantly, nowhere in Wirig does the court even discuss
the elements of proof of either claim. Indeed, the court specifically
held that the battery
and the sexual harassment were the "same
78
wrongful conduct."

Perhaps Magistrate Judge Erickson in Grozdanich stated the
clearest analysis. After discussing Vaughn and Judge Doty's distinction of that holding in Moss, Magistrate Judge Erickson noted:
This distinction is instructive in our consideration of this
aspect of the Plaintiffs claims. Here, the duty imposed by
the doctrines of negligent retention, and supervision have
merged with those imposed by the MHRA, when, on May
22, 1996, the Plaintiff informed her Leisure Hills [employer] that Parson had sexually assaulted her. At that
moment, Leisure Hills became aware that Parson posed a
potential threat to the safety of others, and was placed on
notice of Parson's sexual harassment. From that point
forward, Leisure Hills' statutory duty-to take "timely and
appropriate remedial action-necessarily subsumed any
corresponding common law duty to take remedial measures, so as to ensure the safety of others, as required by
the negligent retention doctrine, and to use ordinary care
in supervising its workplace, as required by the negligent
76.
77.
1996).
78.

Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Minn. 1990).
Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., Inc., 551 N.W.2d 483, 485 (Minn.
Wirig,461 N.W.2d at 379.
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supervision doctrine. Thus, to the extent that the Plaintiffs negligent employment claims request damages, for
these asserted breaches of Leisure Hill's duty of care to
the Plaintiff, which occurred on or after May 22, 1996,
they are preempted by the MHRA."79
Therefore, where the same alleged conduct would violate the
MHRA, and would also state a separate common law or statutory
cause of action, 0 the legislature's intent is clear in the express language of the MHRA that "as to acts declared unfair by section
363.03, the procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive."81

79. Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 981 (D.
Minn. 1998) (citations omitted, emphasis added). The magistrate judge then distinguished the negligent employment claims that occurred before May 22, 1996.
He noted that those claims occurred prior to the sexual assault and therefore he
permitted those claims to "pass, at this time, the preemption hurdle." Id.
80. E.g., Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co., Inc., 447 N.W.2d 180, 187 (Minn. 1989).
81. MINN. STAT. § 363.11 (1994).
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